New deal, old ideas
Why the new Brexit arrangement is full of past British misconceptions of Europe
On Monday, May 19th, the United Kingdom and the European Union reached a new agreement intended to mark a ‘reset’ in their relationship, fulfilling (on the UK side) a key promise of the Labour Party in the 2024 general election campaign. The agreement brings the two parties closer than at any point since the UK left the EU in 2020, establishing or reinforcing cooperation on defence (the UK will be able to access an EU fund worth 150 billion euros), travel, crime, immigration, and food imports and exports, an area in which the UK has implicitly accepted dynamic alignment with European standards. As for the two most controversial issues for Britain, namely fishing and youth mobility, only the former was resolved. In fact, the British ultimately conceded to a key European demand to maintain existing fishing arrangements that allow EU fishing vessels to catch in UK waters at least until 2038. On youth mobility, and a potential return to the Erasmus+ exchange programme, the political declaration includes only vague references to future talks and no binding commitments.
Given the legacy of the Brexit debate in the late 2010s, marked by bitterness across the political spectrum, many on the right of UK politics condemned the deal as a ‘surrender’ to Brussels. However, according to recent polls, attitudes towards the European Union have shifted significantly in Britain, with a majority of the public believing that the UK was wrong to leave the European Union in the first place and even that it should rejoin it. Still, the salience of the issue has faded considerably since its peak between 2016 and 2019. If the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, hailed the deal as ‘historic’, UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer adopted a more moderate tone, emphasising the economic benefits for the UK rather than its renewed partnership with the EU.
More time is needed to evaluate the political, economic and social consequences of this new arrangement. This deal is unlikely to be the final word on the matter: for instance, the opposition Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has already said that once in government, she would reverse at least some elements of this new deal. However, this scenario is increasingly unlikely after the recent disastrous set of local elections for the Tories.
For the time being, it is worth highlighting the different view of the relationship held by the two sides. The United Kingdom has so far adopted a more transactional tone and approach, whereas the European Union has viewed the partnership through the lens of shared values and strategic integration. At one point, Mrs Von der Leyen even remarked that in times of global crises and upheavals, ‘Europe sticks together’. The picture looks much more nuanced and complex, though. For a start, this is not the first deal that the United Kingdom has struck in the last few months. Although they are projected to be less economically significant, Britain had already struck two agreements before this one, with the United States and with India, both with far less political opposition. It has not gone unnoticed in Europe that the UK has agreed a deal with the US before one with the EU, underscoring the symbolic primacy of the ‘special relationship’ with Washington, notwithstanding the increasing foreign policy divergence. Even though the Prime Minister has repeated multiple times that Britain does not need to choose between its American ally and its European partners, should a decision be taken it is not guaranteed that the UK will stick to Europe.
Moreover, the tone and the disputes in the UK confirm the essentially misconceived view that the country has of the European Union. Since 2015 and even before, successive governments have sought to retain as much as possible of the economic relationship with the bloc. However, they have tried to distance Britain from the political arm of that relationship, even before the 2016 referendum: the explicit rejection of key EU policies and principles like the freedom of movement of people is a good case in point. This strategy has repeatedly proven flawed, including in the most recent negotiations.
The United Kingdom continues to underestimate the unity of EU member states. On key principles of the Union, such as free movement or youth mobility, the European Union has repeatedly demonstrated to be able to stick together. It has presented a united front, resisting attempts to divide member states and instead ensuring a united front on all issues. Moreover, the United Kingdom continues to ignore the political dimension of the European Union, present from the early days of the European Economic Community in the 1950s up until today. The European project has always sought to chart a common destiny for European countries, avoiding the repetition of past conflicts and ensuring that cooperation could outlast competition. If the United Kingdom seeks closer economic cooperation and alignment with the bloc, it needs to accept the political implications of this cooperation and of this alignment. Nowadays, bilateral ties with individual EU states can no longer substitute for engagement with the Union as a whole, a Union whose institutional role has only expanded in both scope and authority over recent decades.
Ultimately, the EU appears eager to accept a renewed partnership on the basis unity, rules-based engagement, and political alignment. The UK, meanwhile, continues to navigate an uneasy balancing act. This agreement may fulfil a central electoral promise of the Labour Party and mark the most substantial reset in UK-EU relations since Brexit, but it also reveals the enduring limits of the British approach. The selective engagement that continues to characterise the British approach reflects a long-standing misreading of the EU—not just as a market, but as a political union founded on shared norms and long-term strategic integration.
Certainly, this new agreement represents a pragmatic and overdue turning point. But whether this moment becomes the foundation of deeper reintegration or merely a high point in a fragile rapprochement will depend on whether the UK is willing to move beyond its defensive posture and finally engage with Europe not just as a partner, but as a political project.