Sketches of a way forward
Assessing the future of NATO and beyond
The row over Greenland seems (at the moment) to have passed with a de facto renunciation to control the territory by the United States. However, many questions still linger on in the aftermath of the threats, intimidation and at times disregard that the President of the United States has made towards its main allies in the last few days. Can Europe trust NATO and the American military to come to its aid in the event of an invasion? Can NATO survive, does it have to change even further? And what do other US and European allies, such as those in the Indo-Pacific think of it, how do they see their own relations with this American administration and maybe with the United States more in general?
To address these questions, we should always keep in mind that it is impossible to provide a full answer at this stage, with many actors still assessing their own position. This article is therefore divided into what we know and can predict, what we don’t know and what might come about. It also deals mostly with Europe and Canada, as it will take even more time to assess what Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra and other capitals make of all this.
What we know
NATO, once dubbed the most successful military alliance in history, is very different not just from 1949 (the year of its creation), but also from 2024, when Joe Biden was still in the White House. This change has to do chiefly with a shifting US attitude towards its role in European security and in the wider world as well. European countries and Canada have begun to take notice of these changes, but so far have largely avoided confronting them, in the hope of stemming them and broadly carrying on as before.
However, many taboos have been broken in the last few months, and many others since January 2025, when Donald Trump’s second term began. Gone are the declarations of shared values and common goals of the alliance. Gone is also the instinctive American attachment to Europe, which went back to the Second World War and perhaps much further. The alliance is now much more transactional on both sides of the Atlantic, at times even dangerously so. In the 2024 election campaign, for instance, Donald Trump claimed that the United States would encourage Russia to attack NATO countries that do not ‘pay their bills’ in terms of military spending, thereby linking American protection to a fee which is owed by smaller countries. This was not the spirit in which NATO was created, nor in which it has existed for more than 75 years. The alliance has always served both sides in a mutually beneficial agreement, underpinned by clear and common beliefs, not by a financial contribution agreement.
Experts have pointed to this as a neo-imperial logic that was evident firstly in the seizure of Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro. In the last few days, when President Trump explicitly claimed Greenland as a payback for the American protection of Europe, and when some members of his administration linked it to support to Ukraine, this logic has become only more apparent.
What we don’t know
The United States is not a monolith, neither in terms of government nor in terms of public opinion. Although Congress has so far mostly decided not to challenge the Trump Administration, not even in its most controversial actions, it still retains the power to do so. There are signs that at least some Republican congressmen are beginning to distance themselves from the all-powerful President, even some who had staunchly backed him for years (former Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene of Georgia, who resigned from Congress because of a row with Donald Trump, is a case in point), especially when NATO is at stake, as it still enjoys lots of supporters on Capitol Hill.
Moreover, Trump is very unpopular in the broader electorate, which overwhelmingly rejects the acquisition (and even more the invasion) of Greenland. The Republican party is set to have a bad night in November, when midterm Congressional elections will take place. Although it is easy to assume that the country is now fully controlled by one of the most extreme administrations in American history, it is also wrong to do so. November, therefore, could bring other big shifts in the transatlantic relations and in US foreign policy.
What might come about (and what we can do)
Given the shift and its possible future developments, assessing its scope and its nature is crucial to understand what might happen next on this side of the Atlantic. How can Europe respond?
An authoritative analysis by Lawrence Freedman points out the divide between those who talk in terms of a ‘rupture’ and those who assess this as a ‘transition’, with Freedman broadly in the latter camp. In other words, what we have witnessed could be interpreted either as a watershed moment (with a before and an after), or as a more coherent development within a bigger timeframe, mostly dictated by a more profound change in the US position. While the former would entail the end of NATO and a clear separation between the US and Europe, the latter would see a less powerful but still present NATO, with the Europeans managing more of their security on their own. Only time will tell how this new order might exactly come about, and it is certainly not within the scope of this newsletter to suggest which of the two outcomes is more or less desirable, or more or less feasible. However, this newsletter can point out opportunities and risks in both approaches to this new world. We have identified the following three scenarios for Europe.
For Europe to pursue a radically independent approach from America, it would take time and resources, in a continent that is facing multiple crises at a time and whose politicians are pressed on all sides. The most ardent Europhiles would argue for a federal Europe as the answer to all ills, as they have done since the 1950s. Unfortunately, on its own the European Union is not managing even to ratify a free-trade agreement with the Mercosur countries, so slashing all the differences within the Union with the stroke of a pen seems, at best, idealistic. Europe, moreover, as Freedman points out, is already acting much more independently from America. Coalitions of the willing are being assembled, and a de facto trilateral axis among Britain, France and Germany is forming, mostly outside of formal institutional frameworks (which countries can definitely reassess). Doing too soon even more would stretch European capabilities at its limits, with unpredictable consequences.
Instead, Eurorealists would call for calm. Some of them might suggest to replace America with China, but, tempting as it is, this desire brings its own significant challenges. While China wishes to be seen as a defender of human rights and international law, the reality is much darker. Look at the persecutions of Muslim Uyghurs in the Western provinces, or at the repression of Hong Kong’s democratic movement in 2019. Or look at Taiwan, which is threatened ever more by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Yet, China would welcome cooperation with Europe and its detachment from the United States, though not at any cost and certainly not if it meant sacrificing its most important priorities. As the recent opening of a new massive Chinese embassy in London demonstrates, dealing with China is controversial and potentially risky.
Mixing these approaches is touted as another way forward, as shown by the Canadian Prime Minister, Mark Carney. In a speech at the Davos Economic Forum on Tuesday, Carney stressed the importance for middle countries like Canada of acting together, in this way standing up to bigger powers that want to dominate them and the wider world. He has recently struck a trade deal with China to counter a big imbalance that Canada has with the United States, to which it exports more than 70% of goods. In a way, Carney has so far managed to deal with every great power without sacrificing key Canadian interests, including its sovereignty. Europe would be even better placed to pursue such a strategy, given its size and its geographical location, but even in this case it would face challenges. How would it deal if a crisis erupted in Taiwan, for instance? How could it position itself in key great-power disputes, especially if either America or China demanded loyalty and support?
These are the questions that European countries should be asking themselves. Do they want full independence, and are they prepared to pay the price for it? Do they prefer changing one protector for another, with all its ills? Or do they wish to be realists and reassess relationships with allies and adversaries alike to have a better place at the table? One thing is certain: whether this will be either a rupture or a transition phase would depend on Europe as well. Sitting back and waiting for others to answer these points is not a winning strategy.